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Who Should Determine What Is Best for Children
in State Custody Who Object to Psychotropic
Medication?
Stephen A. Talmadge, Ph.D., J.D.
I. INTRODUCTION

Parents normally hav e the right to direct the education and upbringing of
their children' as well as to decide whether and when their minor children
will get medical treatment.2 The Supreme Court suggested that the Due
Process Clause defends the traditional right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.3 However, in disagreements over the medical treatment of a4
minor, only the minor's parents and the state have standing to go to court.
Courts tend to defer to parental choice in medical treatment cases out of
respect for parental authority, but a court may not always view the best
interests of the child in the same way that child's parents view his or her
interests. Does the state have the child's best interests at heart? It
stretches credulity to think that caseworkers for children in the state's
6
custody have the time to know and understand each child's best interests.
The effectiveness of psychotropic drugs in the treatment of mental illness

Dr. Talmadge is a third %ear la" student at Barry University in Orlando, Florida. J.D.
expected Spring 2006. He received a Ph.D. in psychology in 1989 and was selected as a
Diplomate in Forensic Ps.'chology in 1996. He retired from the active practice of
psychology when he entered law school in 2003. He would like to thank Stuart B. Fisher,
Ph.D. and Karin E Fisher, M A.. L N1F.T. for their helpful comments
1. See, e.g.. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
2 See generally Matthew S. Feigenbaum, lhnorv,' Medical Treatment, and Interspousal
Disagreement. Should Solomon Split the Child*, 41 Dt P \L L L. REV. 841, 851 (1992)
3. See Cruzan '. Dir.. \Io Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
4. See generally In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Muhlenberg
Hosp. %.Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 519-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 771, 774 (I1. 1952).
5. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer. 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013-14 (N.Y. 1979).
6. This statement is not meant to impugn a case worker's caring, but simply means that
they cannot be expected to know each child's best interest because of their limited time Nvith
each one.
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has been demonstrated beyond question.'
However, anti-psychotic
medications arguably limit a person's liberty more than bodily restraints
and may affect control over a person's mind as well as body. 8 The results
of administering these drugs can be more profound than the use of physical
restraints. The Supreme Court has recognized that the drugs psychiatric
patients receive are "mind altering."' Therefore, the choice to make use of
this treatment must be carefully balanced against any possible side effects.''
Research has shown that fourteen- and fifteen-year-old adolescents are
competent to give consent.' 2 Allowing adolescents in state custody to make
their own informed decisions about accepting psychotropic medication best
sercs their legal interests. Furthermore, recognizing and respecting the
child's right to self-determination guarantees due process (liberty).
Part I of this article discusses psychotropic medications and their side
effects. with a focus on anti-psychotic medication, while Part III reviews
informed consent. Part IV discusses competence, comparing the decisional
abilit\ of adolescents with that of adults. Part V discusses decisions to
medicate and Part VI reviewks children, the legal concept of the family, and
children's rights. The article concludes with a suggestion to allow those
adolescents in state custody to make their own decisions about psychotropic
medications.
II. PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION
The use of drugs with well-substantiated effectiveness in psychiatric
disorders has grown extensively since the mid-1950s.' 3 Drugs used in the
management of psychiatric disorders are usually referred to as

7 See Brief for the American Psychiatric Association et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No 89-5120), 1990 WL 10013108
(stating that the American Psychiatric Association has explained in detail in prior briefs that
psychotropic medication is a very effective form of treatment when properly used).
s
See, eg.,Jamie Floyd, Comment, The Administration ol-Psychotropic Drugs to
Prisoncr' State of the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1254. 1264 t I QW).
9. Id. at 1264.
10. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294 (1982).

11. Floyd, supra note 8,at 1249.
12 Sec Brief for American Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Hartigan v.Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673). 1987 \VL 880965 (stating
-[t]hus, it is now generally accepted that by midadolescence (14-15) the great majority of
adolescents do not differ from adults in their capacities to understand and reason about
medical and psychological treatment alternatives, or in their abilities to comprehend and
consider risks and benefits regarding treatment alternatives ").
13.
See generall' BENJAMIN JAMES SADOCK & VIRGINIA \.Corr SADOCK, KAPLAN &
SADO(K'S SYNOPSIS OF PY(HIATR\ BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (9th ed.

2003).
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"psychotropic.' 4 The dictionary defines psychotropic as "of a drug: acting
on the mind."' 5 "[P]sychotropic medication is widely accepted within the
psychiatric community as an extraordinarily effective treatment for both

acute and chronic psychoses, particularly schizophrenia."16
Over 1500 compounds classified primarily as psychotropic agents have
been described." Pschotropic medications have been divided into three
major categories: mood-stabilizers (including anti-depressants), anti-anxiety
sedatives, and anti-psychotics (neuroleptic' 8 ).'9 Some of the more common
mood stabilizers are: Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Elavil, Pamelor, Tofranil,
Sinequin, Nardil, Parnate, Remeron, and Buspar. 21) Prominent anti-anxiety
agents include: Xanax. Librium, Klonopin, Tranzene, Valium, Ativan, and
Serax. -'
Some of the more common anti-psychotic medications are:

Navane, Haldol, and Lithium. 22
Approximately three million Americans were prescribed anti-psychotic
drugs in 1986.73 According to the National Ambulatory Medical Care
Surveys. from 1985 to 1994. the number of office visits during which
psychotropic medication w\as prescribed grew from 32.73 million to 45.64
million, with the proportion of such \isits rising from 5.1% to 6.5%.4 As
of 2003. an estimated 11% of American children had a mental health
impairment that caused important functional deficits.2 5 According to the
U.S. Department of Justice, the number of psychotropic drugs prescribed to
students has climbed from three million in 1992 to more than eighteen

14. See Ross J. Baldessarini, Drugs and the Treatment ol Psychiatric Disorders.
Depression and .4nxiety Disordcrs. in GOOD\I \\ \\[) GILI \\', THE P \RMi \COLOGiCAL
BASIS OF THERAPEUTIC, 44"7-;21 (Joel G. Hardman et al. eds , 10th ed. 2001)
15.
\VFBSTER'S THIRD \E\\ I\TER ,Ti()\
..
\I- DICTIO\,\RY 1834 ( 1981).

16.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U S 210, 226 (1990) (quoting Brief for American

Psychiatric Association as Amlci Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Washington \. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990)(No XX-5 9 9L. 19X9 \L I(27132).
17. See generally E. Usdin. Classilication of Psychotropic Drugs, in PRI\CIPLI.N, OF
PSYCHOPHARM-\COLOGY 191-246 William G. Clark & Joseph del Guidice eds., Academic
Press. Inc. 2d ed. 197N).

18. See Riese v. St. \Iary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr.. 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1310 (Cal. Ct
App. 1987) (defining antipsychotic drugs).
19. See TARASCO\ POCKET PHRM ,\(OPOI IA (Deluxe Lab-coat Pocket Ed. 2002).
20. Id.
21
Id.
22. Id.
23. John Baker, Tardive D'vskinesia: Reducing kfledical Mialpractice Exposure Through
a Risk-Benefit Anal'sis, I DEPAUL J. H[ALTH CARE L. 799, 799 (1997).
24. Harold Alan Pincus et al., Prescribing Trends in Psvchotropic Medications: Prinali
Care. Psvchiatn', and Other '4edical Specialities, 279(7) JAMA 526, 526-31 (1998).
25.
Sherry Glied et al., Trends and Issues in Child and ldolesccnt 11cntal Health, 22
HEALTH AFF. 39, 39-50 (2003).
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million in 2000.26 As of September 30, 2005, there were 14,853 children
receiving mental health services via the Child and Family Services
Department in Florida. 27 According to the Sun-Sentinel in Fort Lauderdale,
[m]ore than one of every 10 children, or 5,100 kids, in the [Florida] state
welfare system are on medications meant to treat depression, schizophrenia
and other mental disorders."2 8
2 9

.4. Anti-Psychotic Medication

This paper focuses on anti-psychotic medication because it "has been the
mainstay of treatment for inpatients and has also advanced the public policy
of deinstitutionalizing patients whenever possible. ' 30 These medications
are primarily used to treat thought disorders. 31 While anti-psychotics have
proven effective in the treatment of schizophrenia, they are infamous for a
wide range of undesirable side effects, including neurological,
cardiovascular, and endocrinological abnormalities. 32 Chlorpromazine, the
first anti-psychotic drug, appeared in the early 1950s under the trade name
34

hich was marketed as electroconvulsive therapy in a bottle.
Thorazine, 33 w%
Some psychiatrists described it as a "chemical lobotomy, ' 35 while the
Supreme Court stated that these drugs are mind-altering.36
Anti-psychotic medication alters the chemical balance in an individual's
brain, leading to changes in one's cognitive processes that are intended to
be beneficial. 37 Although it is unknown exactly hoNw this medication works,
some medical professionals believe that the drugs change levels of
dopamine that are available in the brain .3
By influencing chemical
transmissions in the brain, the drugs sedate the schizophrenic and suppress
2

attnt
or a thief may capitalize on Your carelessness, SCH.
April 1. 2005.
27. Health and Human Services, The Florida Department of Children and Families,
http://dcfdashboard.dcf.state. fl. us index.cfm?purpose-id-wl&mcode-temp%2CM003 1&pag
e= previc\%&tcmp M0031 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
2,.
lark Hollis, Child Medications to Be Reviewed: Foster Agency to Examine Use of
Drugs, SL \-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 20, 2003, at 5B.
29 Antipsychotic drugs refers to medications such as Thorazine, NIellaril, Prolixin, and
Haldol that are used in treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia.
Sccure

VIOLI Nc

30.

/itclL'nt inc'tlc

ALERT,

Gerald J. Schaefer, Drug-Induced Alteration of Psychotic Behavior: Who Benelits?.

9 JkL. & HEALTH 43. 44 (1995).
31. Set, Sadock & Sadock, .supranote 13.
32.
33.

Schaefer, supra note 30, at 47; see also Baldessarini, supra note 14. at 500.
SHELDON GELMN\, MEDICATING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A HISTORY 24 11999).

34

Id.

35.

Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 540 (Nev. 1991 ) (Springer, J., dissenting).

36.
37.

See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1990).
ld.
Scc United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004).

3,
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psychotic symptoms. The drugs have a propensity to39shorten confinement
stays and allow patients to function in the community.
B. Side Effects
Psychotropic medications, in particular anti-psychotics, often produce
side effects that range from short-term and merely discomforting to
permanent and life-threatening.40 Many side effects fall within the category
of extrapyramidal symptoms, which are neurological side-effects of antipsychotics. 41 Among the temporary and reversible extrapyramidal effects
are dystonic reactions, akathisia, and Parkinsonism. 12 Reactions include
muscle spasms, especially in the eyes, neck, face and arms; irregular
flexing, writhing, or grimacing movements; or protrusion of the tongue.4 3
Parkinsonism produces a mask-like face, drooling, muscle rigidity, a
shuffling gait, and tremors.- The most damaging extrapyramidal symptom,
and the one that has generated the most scrutiny and controversy, is tardive
dyskinesia, a syndrome associated with the long-term use of anti-psychotic
drugs. 45 It is a sometimes-permanent neurological disorder characterized by
involuntary muscular movements.46
Although all medications have side effects, it has been concluded that
these psychotropic medications, particularly anti-psychotic medications, are
hazardous.4 7 One court said, "[t]hey deaden the patient's ability to think
and their forced administration is an affront to basic concepts of human
dignity.,48
C. Administration
Psychotropic medications can be administered either voluntarily or
The level of incompetence required for involuntary
involuntarily.
psychiatric hospitalization is based on the dangerousness of the patient.
39. Thomas A. Bickers, Psvchiatry, with a Conscience: A Survey of the Right to Control
PsychotropicMedication and the Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient,54 TENN. L. RE%,.
85, 87 (1986).
40. See Braden A. Borger, Comment, Sell v. United States: The Appropriate Standard
for Involuntarily Administering Antipsychotic Drugs to Dangerous Detainees for Trial, 35
SETON HALL L. REv. 1099, 1114 (2005).
41. See Harper,494 U.S. at 229; see also generally Baldessarini, supra note 14.
42. See Harper,494 U.S. at 230; see also generally Baldessarini, supra note 14.
43. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 184 (1980).
44. See Baldessarini, supra note 14, at 500-02.
45. See Harper,494 U.S. at 230.
46. Id.
47. See Borger, supra note 40, at 1113-14; see also Brooks, supra note 43.
48. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 936 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
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Most current statutes regarding the civil commitment of adults not only
require that the individual suffer from mental illness, but also that the
infirmity renders a danger to himself or others. 49 This level of competence
is not the same as what is required for forced administration of psychotropic
medications. An individual can be considered incompetent in refusing
psychiatric hospitalization but sufficiently competent to refuse psychotropic
medications.5 0 In 1986, a New York court found:
[N]either the fact that appellants are mentally ill nor that they have been
involuntarily committed, without more, constitutes a sufficient basis to
conclude that they lack the mental capacity to comprehend the
consequences of their decision to refuse medication that poses a
significant risk to their physical well-being. Indeed, it is well accepted
that mental illness often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving
other areas unimpaired, and consequently. that many mentally ill persons
retain the capacity to function in a competent manner...51
Although an individual's mental illness and involuntary commitment
both raise questions about his or her capacity to make a rational and
knowledgeable treatment decision, they do not alone demonstrate
By extension, they do not necessarily justify the forced
incapacity.
administration of psychotropic medications to the individual. 2
The psychiatric treatment of adults and children is governed in all states
by legislative acts.53 These statutes, which establish guidelines for both
voluntary admission and involuntary psychiatric examination, generally
Some states break the
appear alongside other mental health legislation.'
56
55
rules down into adult and juvenile subdivisions, while others divide their
acts on the basis of mental illness 57 or drug/alcohol commitment
Each jurisdiction's laws typically provide for short-term
procedures. 5

49. Ken Kress, .4n Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with Serious
Ahental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REx.

1269, 1290 (2000) (discussing dangerousness and involuntary commitment standards).
50. See Kathleen Knepper, The Importance of Establishing Competence in Cases
Involving the Involuntary Administration o PsychotropicAIfediations, 20 L,\" & PSYCHOL.
REV, 97, 101 (1996).

51.

Ri ers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986).

52.

Floyd, supra note 8, at 1258.

53.
54.

Knepper, supra note 50, at 98.
See, e.g., "The Florida Mental Health Act" or "'The Baker Act."

FLA. STAT. §

394.451 (West 2(002).
55
Sec. e.g., § 394.451.

56,
57.
5,.

See, e.g., §§ 394.490-.4995 (West 2002).
See, e.g., MIsS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -23 (West 2005).
See, e.g., §§ 41-4-1 to- 23.
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emergency admission with procedures for accomplishing an evaluation:
Ill. INFORMED CONSENT

Informed consent isdefined as -[a] patient's knowing choice about a
medical treatment or procedure, made after a physician or other healthcare
provider discloses xwhatever information a reasonably prudent provider in
the medical community would give to a patient regarding the risks involved
in the proposed treatment or procedure. 60 Informed consent is generally
required for medical treatment. 6' The objectives of the informed consent
principle, inter alia, have been defined in the following way: (1)to promote
individual autonomy; (2) to protect the patient subject's status as a human
being worthy of respect: (3) to avoid fraud and duress; (4) to encourage
self-scrutiny by the physician/researcher; (5) to promote rational decision
making; and (6) to involxe the public in important questions about health
care policy and research. "
Courts first discussed informed consent in 1957.63 This doctrine posits
that physicians have a duty to make sufficient disclosures to patients about
planned medical treatment so that patients can make well-informed
choices. " ' A number of states have moved toward a patient-oriented
approach instead of a physician-driven method.M This technique regulates
medical practitioners by requiring them to probe the informational
necessities of the "reasonable patient," rather than simply relying entirely
on existing medical practice to come to a decision about what
comprises material disclosure. 66
A substantial amount of judicial examination of informed consent has
involved minors and medically performed abortions. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, while holding that
parts of a Pennsylvania statute requiring parents to be informed about
59. See generally FLA. STAT. AN N. § 394.463 (A'est Supp. 2006).
60. BLACK'S LA\' DICTIO\ARY 130 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
61.
Washington v.Glucksberg. 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)).
62. Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research
L. REV. 340, 340 (1974).
and Treatment, 123 U. P,-\.
63. Richard A. Heinemann, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v.
Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L. RE\. 1079, 1081-82 (1997)
(discussing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957)).
64. Id.at 1082.
65. Armand Arabian, Informed Consent: From the Ambivalence of Arato to the Thunder
of Thor, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 261, 262 (1994).
66. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899. 903
(1994).
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abortions performed on underage girls67 was unconstitutional, upheld the
statute's definition of informed consent:

"Informed consent" means a written statement, voluntarily entered into
by the person upon whom .. whereby she specifically consents thereto.
Such consent shall be deemed to be an informed consent only if it
affirmatively appears.., that she has been advised (i) that there may be
detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not foreseeable,
(ii) of possible alternatives ... and (iii) of the medical procedures to be
in readily understandable terms in
used. Such statement
6 ... shall be ...

so far as practicable.

8

The definition articulated here is a good reflection of what is meant by
informed consent.
Even when a person is incompetent to give informed consent for
voluntary psychiatric hospitalization, that does not mean she is incompetent
However, if a mentally ill person has given
to refuse medication.
informed consent, it may not be clear. The mere fact that a person has
signed a form does not mean that actual consent has been obtained. The
Supreme Court thus has wamed of "[t]he risk ... that some persons who
come into ... mental health facilities will apparently be willing to sign
forms authorizing admission and treatment, but will be incompetent to give
the 'express and informed consent' .... "'
IV. COMPETENCE

Mental illness and legal incompetence are not coterminous; therefore, it
does not necessarily follow that all mentally ill people are legally
incompetent. 71 "Incompetence," contrasted with "legal incompetence,"
may have different meanings in general custom, everyday language, the
medical profession, and in other scientific fields. 72 Basically, competence
refers to the ability to come to a decision by assimilating information

67. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
68 Id. at 583 (Green, Dist. J., dissenting) (quoting 35 PA. STAT. § 6602 (repealed
1982)).
69. See S. REP. No. 96-712, at 81 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 3372, 3448
("While a judicial commitment authorizes one's physical detention, it does not automatically
follow that the state may force a competent individual to undergo any and all forms of
treatment. A patient still retains separate rights to privacy.").
70. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 (1990) (dictum).
71. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995).
72. Israel Doron, From Lunacy to IncapacitY and Beyond - Guardianship of the Elderl ,
and the Ontario Experience in Defining "Legal Incompetence, " 19 HEALTH L. CAN. 95, 97

(May 1998-May 1999).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/3

8

Talmadge: Who Should Determine What Is Best for Children in State Custody W

2006]

Children in State Custody and Psychotropic Medication

191

through a reasonable proccss of thinking.7 3 Only if an individual's ability
to make independent decisions is severely limited is she considered
incompetent to make a treatment decision] 4 The incompetent individual
differs from a competent person because she is unable to put together and
logically present her o\vn viewpoint about the planned treatment. 7'
If an individual is incompetent, the doctrine of informed consent posits
that the person given the authority to make the treatment decision for the
incompetent individual should have the opportunity to assess the choices
available and the risks of each choice.76 The two different standards that
may be used in complying with informed consent for an incompetent
individual are the application of the "best interests" standard and the
substituted judgment standard, discussed below. The former reflects the
idea that the treatment decision that is to be made on an incompetent
patient's behalf should advance the individual's best interests.7 7 This
standard requires that decisions about the administration of medication
should be made in the patient's best interests, as opposed to independent
interests that parents or others may have.78 Unfortunately, the legal
decision-maker is left xxith little direction regarding how a child's interests
are to be determined under this test.79
Lois Weithorn and Susan Campbell found that choices made by fourteenyear-olds did not differ significantly from those of adults in terms of
comprehension, understanding of alternatives, rational reasoning, and
decision making processes NN
hen responding to medical and psychological
treatment hypotheticals 5 0 At least one court paid attention to Weithom's
73. See Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment. A
Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 417-18 (1978).
74. Stephen A. Talmadge, Competence to Make Medical Treatment Decisions,91 NA',
MED. 21, 23 (Apr. 2000). see generallv Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: 4 Misguided
Strategyfor SecuringDeath Wiith Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REx. 1823, 1838 (2003).
75. See Brief of Free Speech Advocates and Christian Advocates Serving Evangelism as
Amici Cunae in Support of Respondents at 2, Cruzan v Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (No. 88-1503); see generally Randy K. Otto et al., Child Custody Evaluation, in
11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 179, 181 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2003).
76. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("True consent to what
happens to one's self isthe informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each.").
77. Knepper, supra note 50, at 104-05; see also Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests
Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens PatriaeAuthority and Judicial Oversight in
Best Interests Determinationsfor Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED.
283, 303-04 (1991).
78. Otto et al., supra note 75, at 181.
79. See JONATHAN W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD CUSTODY
EVALUATIONS 59-60 (1998).
80. Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
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research and expertise when it proclaimed, "a court should not dismiss
outright the value of a twelve-year-old's opinion."" Child psychologists
Thomas Grisso and Linda Vierling suggest that by age fifteen, children
possess psychological abilities that are important to the decision-making
2
The
process and are no less competent than adults to give consent.
fifteen-year-old adolescents included in their study were able to
concentrate, delay responses while contemplating results, think about more
than one treatment choice, and use inductive and deductive reasoning.83 A
Florida court cited the research studies of both Weithorn and Campbell and
of Grisso and Vierling when it recognized the decision-making abilities of
minors
and the intent of the Florida legislature.' Overall, "[a] sizeable
and convincing body of research shows that children possess far more
competence than has previously been recognized."5 6
V. RIGHT TO REFUSE

In our society people ha\ e the right to make treatment decisions that may
lead to harm."'
-[E]ven truly irrational choices are not sufficient to
establish a patient's incompetence and to justify overriding them."88
Furthermore, -[a] competent person has a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment."8" For example, a
California appellate court held that all competent patients, whether
terminally ill or not, have the right to refuse any and all medical treatment
regardless of their moti\es for doing so." ° In another case, an appellate
court in Florida upheld the request of a seventy-three-year-old paralyzed
and terminally ill patient to remove his respirator.s The court reasoned that
the constitutional right to privacy protects the sanctity of individual choice
and self-determination, including a competent patient's decision to refuse

Adolescents to M1akc In/ormed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DE\. 1589, 1595 (1 982).
81
Ilre T.W.,623 A 2d 116. 118 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
S2
Grisso & \ierling, supra note 73, at 423.
83. Sce id. at 418.
X4. S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4784 (West 2005).
86. RICHARD E. REDDING, DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR JUVENILES IN CIVIL
COxIxiITMii NT PRO(EEDINGS 18 (Elissa C. Lichtenstein et al. eds., 1991) (cited in Maggie
Brandow, A Spoonful of Sugar Wfon't Help This tecdh ic, Go Down: Psychotropic Drugs for
.4bused and Neglected Children. 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (1999)).
87. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).
88. Dan W. Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients lake Irrational
Choices, 322 NEW F,(j. J. MID). 1595, 1599 (May 31, 1990).

89

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).

90.
91.

Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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lifesaving treatment.", This protection extends to the mentally ill by
allowing them to refuse invasive treatment, even when the state may think
such measures are in their best interest."'
The legal basis for forced administration of psychotropic drugs is rooted
in the police and patens patriae 4 powers of the state. 95 The parenspatriae
authority implicates best interests treatment decisions, in which the state has
an interest in protecting the welfare of a mentally ill patient.9 6 In contrast,
the police power relates to the state's responsibility to protect others from
the potentially troublesome, violent acts of a mentally ill patient.97 Thus,
under parens patriaeand police powers, the administration of psychotropic
medication can be justified on the basis that the effects are more beneficial
than harmful, or that the use of the drug is necessary for the protection of
others."5
The Supreme Court held in Mills v. Rogers that involuntarily committed
mental patients had a constitutional right to refuse anti-psychotic drugs,
except where the state's police power or parens patriae interests
outweighed the patient's rights. 99 The Court also held that a state may grant
greater liberty interests than the Constitution requires and that state law may
determine mental patients' rights, "' ° permitting fewer medications to be
administered involuntarily in states that recognize a greater liberty interest
than that which is federally guaranteed. The Mills case found that
committed patients had a liberty interest in refusing drugs and that this
interest could be superseded only when outweighed by the state's
interests.' 0l
Further, the Court held that judicial determination of
substituted judgment was required before the administration of drugs, even
92. Id. at 162.
93. See, e.g.. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the ight to be left alone is most comprehensive and most valued by
civilized society).
94. "A doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of
a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (8th ed. 2004)_
95. Knepper, supra note 50, at 106.
96. The Tenth Amendment is considered to be the source of state police power and
provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X; see also In re Doe, 104 A.D.2d 200, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("The
court under its parens patriae authority is empowered to protect the person and property of
an individual who is not capable of making decisions in his own best interests").
97.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

98. Knepper, supra note 50, at 107.
99. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982) (discussing powers of the state).
100. Id. at 300 (discussing minimum protection of rights).
101. Id. at 303-04 (comparing federal and state protection of liberty rights).
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2
to incompetent persons. 1

VI. DECISIONS TO MEDICATE

The majority of judicial decisions examining forced medication have
involved the competence to stand trial and also within the context of
incarceration. The patients in these decisions have generally been found to
be competent to make treatment decisions. In addition, committed patients
normally may only be forcibly medicated during potentially dangerous
emergencies.1 03 The state has relied upon its power as parens patriae to
justify involuntary medication. Yet, this power to contradict a person's
wishes must be significantly limited, as it conflicts directly with individual
autonomy. Even without these limits, one can interpret the state's role as
"'parent" to mean that the state can intervene more extensively to prevent
self-harm than to avert harm to others. There are no cases directly
addressing the issue of whether a child has a liberty interest that allows her
to refuse psychotropic medication.
Cases involving refusal of psychotropic medication have been decided
using either a legal or medical model." 4 The former gives priority to the
patient's constitutional rights, while the latter presumes that the treatment
decision is primarily a medical matter.'0 5 The majority of courts have
deferred to medical decision-makers when there is a conflict between a
patient's right to decline anti-psychotic medication and a state's insistence
that the patient be administered the medication.' °6 In considering both the
procedural and substantive rights to refuse psychotropic medications and
the state's authority to override the patient's decision, one must determine
which model will be applied to the decision regarding whether refusal of
the medication is acceptable.
The Supreme Court has avoided clarifying whether competent or
incompetent patients enjoy a substantive right to refuse the administration
of psychotropic drugs. Although it suggested that the mentally ill enjoy
constitutional and common law rights like other patients, the Court limited
these rights to procedural protections against obvious abuse. However, it
also failed to make a clear-cut finding regarding the competence of a mental
patient to make a treatment decision on his or her own behalf. °7 The

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
863 F.2d
107.

Id.
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979).
Knepper, supra note 50, at 107.
Id. at 108.
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990); United States v. Charters,
302, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1988).
Knepper, supra note 50, at 98.
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procedural protections concern the minimum constitutional standard
required for determining that the individual's liberty interest is actually
outweighed in a particular case.' 08 The substantive issues that the Court did
not address include the meaning of the protected constitutional interest and
the identification of conditions under which opposing state interests might
be more important than the patient's interest. 09 As one commentator
expressed, "[t]he lack of doctrinal direction has been exacerbated by the
Supreme Court's reluctance to decide many of the fundamental
constitutional dilemmas presented by an institutionalized individual's
decision to refuse anti-psychotic medications."' 0
Although the Supreme Court has evaded the issue, other courts have held
that there is a constitutional privacy right to refuse psychotropic medication.
In Davis v. Hubbard, a federal district court held that the common law
history of individual independence in medical decisions required a finding
that the right to privacy permits rejecting treatment in civil commitment
contexts.'" In Bee v. Greaves, the Tenth Circuit also found a privacy right
to refuse treatment based on individual bodily autonomy," 2 citing Whalen
v. Roe, in which the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy
encompasses independence in making definite kinds of significant
decisions.'13
Recently, the Ninth Circuit indicated the Supreme Court's preference in
letting medical professionals decide medication issues rather than the
courts.' 4 In a 2003 case. the Supreme Court found that "there are often
strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of
drugs can be justified on... alternative grounds before turning to the trial
competence question," and discussed other, non-judicially-mandated ways
to require involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.'' 5
Although the circuit courts seem to be divided, it appears that applicable
precedent exists for asserting a right to refuse psychotropic medication on
the basis of a liberty interest and constitutional privacy grounds."16
'

108.

Harper,494 U.S. at 220 (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)).

109. Henry A. Dlugacz, Riggins v. Nevada: Towards a Unified Standard for a
Prisoner'sRight to Refuse Treatment? 17 LA\\ & PSYCHOL. REV. 41, 43 (1993).
110. Id. at 43.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 938 (N.D.Ohio 1980).
Bee v. Geaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2005).
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003).

116.

See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 295, 298-99 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d

836, 844-45 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Rennie IIr'); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D.
Ohio 1980).
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A. Aledical Decision-MakingCases
One of the first cases that applied deference to medical decision-making
was Vitek v. Jones.117 Nebraska sought to remove an injunction that
prohibited it from transferring Jones, a mentally ill state prisoner, to a
mental hospital.'" Jones had been convicted of robbery and sentenced to a
term of three to nine years in state prison." 9 He was transferred to the
penitentiary hospital in January 1975.12 Two days after his transfer, Jones
was placed in solitary confinement, during which he set his mattress on fire,
thus burning himself severely and resulting in treatment at the bum unit of a
private hospital.' 21 Upon his release, it was determined that he was
suffering from a mental illness or defect and could not receive proper
treatment in the prison. 22 He was transferred to a state mental hospital
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Institutions.12 3 Jones
argued that he was receiving treatment against his \kill and that he was
continuing to suffer from the stigmatizing consequences of the initial
determination of mental illness. 2 4 The Supreme Court affirmed the order
of the district court, which had initially found that inmates have a liberty
interest in refusing to be transferred to a mental hospital unless afflicted by
a mental disease that cannot be sufficiently treated in prison. 2 5 The district
court held that in order to afford sufficient protection to this liberty interest,
the state was required to observe minimum procedures before transferring a
prisoner to a mental hospital.'2 The district court further found that the
state had satisfied the independent decision-maker element. 12 In doing so,
the state had also avoided unnecessary intrusion into either medical or
correctional judgments by providing that the independent decision-maker
conducting the transfer need not come from outside the prison or hospital
administration.'
The transfer of Jones to a mental hospital was thus a
medical decision, not a judicial one.
In another case, John Rennie brought a class action suit against a hospital

117.

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

1 1x

Id. at 486.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.at 484.
Id

128.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 488.
Id. at494-95.
Id. at 494-96.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/3

14

Talmadge: Who Should Determine What Is Best for Children in State Custody W

2006]

Children in State Custody and Psychotropic Medication

197

claiming that he had a constitutional right to refuse anti-psychotic drugs. 29
The federal district court in Rennie i. Klein deferred to the independent

medical decision-maker, thus recognizing the right of a person who has
been civilly committed to refuse psychotropic medication.' 30 The district
court, recognizing a constitutional ight to refuse treatment, denied Rennie's
injunction."' It reasoned that in the absence of an emergency, due process
required an assessment of: (1) the patient's capacity to decide; (2) the
patient's physical threat to others; (3) the existence of any less restrictive
treatment; and (4) the risk of permanent side effects.132 Although the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's analysis and stated that Rennie had a
constitutional right to refuse medications, it left the decision whether to
33
medicate involuntarily committed patients up to medical professionals.1
The appellate court indicated that the appropriate test is whether a
physician's decision %vas such a substantial departure from accepted
professional standards as to show that he did not actually base the decision
on those accepted standards.' '
In United States v. Charters, a patient contended that medication without
consent or a judicial determination of incompetence was a violation of
constitutionally protected liberty interests. 35 The Fourth Circuit ruled that
anti-psychotic medications could be given without the consent of an
involuntarily committed psychiatric defendant who had previously been
declared incompetent to stand trial so long as suitable medical professionals
had decided to medicate him in a non-arbitrary fashion. 136 The court stated
that, in this case, there vas no violation of constitutional rights and that the
defendant's interests xere adequately protected by the exercise of the
professional judgment of
medical personnel at the time the decision to
137
made.
was
him
medicate
Following the Charters and Rennie holdings, the Supreme Court ruled in
Washington v. Harper that a medical decision can override a treatment
refusal when a psychiatric patient refused medication.1 31 In 1976, Walter
129. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Rennie I')_
130. Id. at 268, 279: see also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844-45 (3d Cir. 1981)
("Rennie III"); Rennie v. Klein. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) ("Rennie I'); Rennie v.
Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) ("Rennie I').
131.
RennieL 462 F. Supp. at 1142.
132. Id. at 1145-46; see also Rennie 111. 653 F.2d at 839.
133. Rennie IV, 720 F.2d at 273-74.

134.

Id.

135.

United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir. 1988).

136.
137.

Id. at 313.
Id.

138. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215, 227 (1990) (noting that the drugs
administered to respondent, Walter Harper, included Trilafon, Haldol, Prolixin, Taractan,
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Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery and was incarcerated at the
Washington State Penitentiary until 1980.139 For the majority of that time,
he was housed in the prison's mental health unit and he initially consented
40
to treatment, including the administration of anti-psychotic drugs.
However, in November 1982 he refused to continue taking the prescribed
medications,' prompting a request to administer anti-psychotic medication
over his objection. 42 The Supreme Court affirmed the administration
order,' 43 finding that it was proper to consider the medical basis upon which
the decision was made and that due process was satisfied by managerial and
professional judgment reviews.'" The Court allowed forced medication
with only an internal, institutionally-based due process appraisal, examining
three significant factors: (1) a rational connection between the prison
regulation and a legitimate government interest, (2) impact of the
accommodation of the asserted right, and (3) the existence of ready
alternatives. 145 The Court held that Washington state policy, which allowed
prison authorities to administer medication to inmates against their will,
was constitutional because the procedures did not deprive the prisoner of
the right to refuse treatment without adequate due process. 146
B. Legal Decision-MakingCases
There have been cases where courts have held that involuntary
administration of anti-psychotic medication was unconstitutional. Under a
rights-driven model, a 1986 case in Massachusetts affected the manner of
operation of health facilities for the mentally challenged. 47 Mental patients
filed a civil rights action against the physicians under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,148
asserting that the policies of forced medication and involuntary seclusion in

Loxitane, Mellaril, and Navane).
139. Id.
140. Id
141. Id,
142. Id. at215.
143. Id. at 222-23.
144. Harper,494 U.S. at 231.
145. Id. at 224-25.
146. Id. at 215. Washington State policy 600.30 %%as developed in partial response to
the Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Under Special Offender Center
Policy 600.300, involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medication is limited to those
inmates assigned to that facility: (1) who are suffering from a mental disorder and (2) who
are either gravely disabled or present a likelihood of serious harm to themselves or others as
a result of that mental disorder, and (3) for whom the medication has been prescribed or
approved by a psychiatrist.
147. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
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non-emergency circumstances violated their constitutional rights.1 49 The
Rogers v. Okin case, popularly known as the Boston State case,150 addressed
liberty and First Amendment rights and held that a patient must be
5
judicially certified as incompetent in order to be involuntarily medicated., '
The court held that committed patients are generally competent to make
treatment decisions, including psychotropic medication, except in an
emergency.
In Riggins v.

Nevada, the

Supreme

Court held that the daily

administration of 450 milligrams of the anti-psychotic drug Mellail during
the trial of Riggins, an accused murderer, created an improperly high
danger that his constitutional trial rights were being violated. 53 After being
taken into custody on a homicide charge, Riggins reported hearing voices
in his head and having trouble sleeping.l 4 A psychiatrist prescribed an
anti-psychotic drug, with which the defendant had been successfully treated
in the past, and an antiepileptic drug. 55 Riggins argued that sustained
administration of these drugs infringed upon his freedom and that the drugs'
effect on his demeanor and mental state during trial would deny him due
process rights.' ' Riggins also claimed that, because he would offer an
insanity defense at trial, he had a right to show jurors his "true mental
state."' 157 In response, the state noted that Nevada law prohibits the trial of
incompetent persons and argued that the trial court therefore had authority
to compel Riggins to take medication required to ensure his competence.'15
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Nevada Supreme Court erred by not
acknowledging Riggins' liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs, stating, "[t]his error may well have impaired the
constitutionally protected trial rights Riggins invokes."' 159 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed the view that the due process clause
prohibited involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medicines and wrote

149. Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1352.
150. Gutheil & Appelbaum, The patient always pays: Reflections on the Boston State
case and the right to rot, 5 MAN & MED. 3, 3 (1980).
151. Okn, 478 F. Supp. at 1364; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 150, at 4.
152. Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1364; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 150, at 4.
153. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1992).
154. Id. at 129.

155.

Id.

156.
157.
158.

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 130; see also NF%'. REV. STAT. § 178.400 (2005) (stating in pertinent part: "A

person may not be tried or adjudged to punishment for a public offense while he is
incompetent.").
159.

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137.
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6
that the understanding about the properties of these drugs is limited. 1
In Rivers v. Katz, a major New York decision consolidating three
individual complaints,' 6' the Court of Appeals of New York held that the
state constitution162 permitted individuals a right to refuse treatment that
could only be overridden after a hearing determining that the patient was
dangerous or incompetent.' 63 In this case, the use of anti-psychotics
(Prolixin Hydrochloride, Prolixin Decanoate, Mellaril, Navane, and
Lithium) was ordered pursuant to administrative review. 64 New York did
not dispute the right of competent adults to refuse anti-psychotic
medication, but instead argued that an involuntarily committed mental
patient is presumably incompetent in exercising this right because impaired
judgment had led to commitment and an inability to make decisions
regarding treatment and care.'W

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if a patient is not dangerous,
courts, not medical professionals, must determine whether involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication is authorized. 66 The details
surrounding the case of Charles Sell, a former dentist ith a long history of
mental illness, 6 7 are unfortunate:
'.

In September 1982, after telling doctors that the gold he used for fillings
had been contaminated by Communists, Sell was hospitalized, treated
with anti-psychotic medication, and subsequently discharged ... In June
1984, Sell called the police to say that a leopard was outside his office
boarding a bus, and he then asked the police to shoot him ...In May
1997, the Government charged Sell xith submitting fictitious insurance
claims for payment ...A grand jury later produced a superseding
indictment charging Sell and his wife wvith 56 counts of mail fraud, 6
counts of Medicaid fraud, and 1 count of money laundering. 168
The Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision because it failed
to find Sell dangerous, 69 thus holding that if a patient is not dangerous,
courts must determine whether involuntary administration of psychotropic

160. Id. at 138-39.
161. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (important because of its clarity
and unanimity).
162. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
163. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343-44.
164. Id. at 339-40 (citing N.Y. CLS Mental Hyg. LawN § 9.27).
165.

Id. at341.

166.

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).

167.
168.

Id. at 169.
Id. at 169-70.
See id.at 186.

169.
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medication is authorized.171 The Court reasoned:
[t]he medical experts may find it easier to provide an informed opinion
about \ hether, gi~en the risk of side effects, particular drugs are
medically appropriate and necessary to control a patient's potentially

dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the patient himself) than
to t to balance harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially
legal questions of trial fairness and competence.

VII. CHILDREN

In the United States, minors are generally considered legally incompetent
and thus cannot consent to or refuse most forms of medical treatment. i72
Only a child's parents and the state have standing to go to court in a typical
dispute over the administration of medical treatment to a minor. 173 "The
law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions."' 74 Minors characteristically
depend on their families' 5 and 'the wishes of the minor receive little or no
deference if the case is litigated in court., , 17" However, because unlimited
parental discretion creates a real danger of unfair action and exploitation,
particularly among poorer families, courts intervene
at different levels to
77
give some amount of due process to youngsters.1
The recognition of children's rights under the law did not begin until the
1960s, when the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution provides
clear authority for the protection of children's rights.'17 However, Supreme
Court decisions throughout the twentieth century have usually granted
constitutional protection to the rights of parents to rear and educate their

170.
171.

See id. at 181.
Id. at 182.

172.
173.

See generally Feigenbaum supra note 2.
See generally In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Jehovah's

Witnesses of WXash. v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (D. Wash. 1967);
Muhlenberg Hosp. v.Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Il. 1952).
174. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
175. Otto et al., supra note 75, at 179.
176. Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in
Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2076 (1996).

177.
CASES

ANDREA A. MOENSSNES
1167 (4th ed. 1995).

ET. AL, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

178. See Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client
Relationship, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 264 (1995).
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children. 79 Parental rights in the context of decision-making usually
include the right of parents to make the vital choice of whether and when
minor children will receive medical treatment. 80 "It is not disputed that a
child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the state's
decision constitutes state action under the
involvement in the commitment
8
Fourteenth Amendment."' '
A. Best Interests
The interests of parents and children are viewed as co-extensive and
courts presume that parents will make medical decisions that comport with
their child's best interests. 8 2 A state may use its parens patriae power to
83
override parental decisions if they threaten the child's best interests.'
Courts often look to the best interests of the child in making decisions about
treatment, 1" by which the state acts "in loco parentis."
However, in many cases, a court may not view the best interests of the
child in the same way as the parents. In In re C. A., an Illinois appellate
court ruled that where the consent or desire of the infant was
indeterminable, the juvenile court properly applied the "best interests" of
the minor standard. 8 5 Because of her premature birth, cocaine withdrawal
symptoms, and the inability of her nineteen-year-old parents to care for her,
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a
petition for adjudication
of wardship in the juvenile division of Cook
86
Court.
Circuit
County
A New York court in In re Cicero held that parental rights were not
absolute and that the court was empowered to intervene when the child's
well-being demanded judicial intervention."" Because the child in the case
had a realistic possibility to live a functional, fulfilling life through surgery,
the court refused to allow parental inaction to defeat that chance.'
179. See, e.g.. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[Clonstitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.").
180. See Feigenbaum, supra note 2.
181.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); see also generally Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418,425 (1979); Inre Gault, 387 U.S. 1,50 (1967).
182. See Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LLE L. RE%. 695, 713-15 (1993).
183. Exparte Crouse, 4 WHART. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
184. Literally, "in the place ofa parent." BLACK'S LA\\ DICTION %RY 791 (7th ed. 1999).
185. lnre C.A., 236 Il1.
App. 3d 594, 609 (II. App. Ct. 1992).
186
Id.at 598.
187. In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 702 (N.Y. Misc. 1979).
188. Id.at701.
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Another court in New York held almost identically against a parent, in spite
of the mother's religious opposition to the planned medical treatment.""'
The court found that if the child did not have the proposed medical
treatment "his chances for a normal, useful life [were] virtually nil.' 90 The
child's mother, a Jehovah's Witness, had denied consent for a blood
transfusion that would have been necessary to safely perform a surgery to
correct facial deformities.191
What seems particularly important in the court's determination is the
realistic existence of alternatives for treatment other than the one refused by
the parent. In October 1977, Joseph Hofbauer, then a seven-year-old child,
was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. 192
The attending physician
recommended that Joseph's treatment include radiation treatments and
possibly chemotherapy, the conventional modes of treatment.19 3 Joseph's
parents, however, rejected this advice and instead embarked on a course of
nutritional, or metabolic, therapy, including injections given by another
physician. 1 4 The Court of Appeals of New York in In re Hojbauer
dismissed the allegations of child neglect against the parents because their
decision about the care had not been rejected
in the medical field and was
95
physician.
skilled
a
of
advice
the
on
based
Although the earlier case of Painter v. Bannister has been overruled on
other points of law, the decision by the Supreme Court of Iowa remains
valid where it did find that it was in the child's best interest to be removed
from the stable atmosphere of the grandparents against the warnings of an
eminent child psychologist and send him to an uncertain future in the home
of his father, who had a "Bohemian approach to finances and life in
196
general."'

Thus, while courts certainly ratify parental decision-making in some
medical treatment cases out of deference for parental authority and religious
beliefs, the right of parents to refuse consent for treatment for their children
is far from absolute. When courts take precedence over parental opposition
to treatment, however, they usually do so because mandating treatment is in
the best interests of the child, not because of any deference to the child's
desires. 197
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Inre Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 658 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 634-45.
In re Hofbauer, 393 N E.2d 1009, 1011 (N.Y. 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1014.
Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1966).
Hawkins, supra note 176, at 2090.
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B. Substituted Judgment
The substituted judgment standard requires the decision-maker "to
ascertain the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences" and to
attempt to make the decision that a particular incompetent person would
make if he or she were competent.' ' Substituted judgment does not apply
to children because they have never been "competent," but instead, their
parents' judgment is substituted. 99 Parents are not always allowed to
substitute their judgment if the child has a chance to lead a normal life once
gixen the disputed treatment and if no alternative treatment is proposed. A
Florida court purported to employ the substituted judgment approach in
allow.ing the withdrawal of life-support systems from a ten-month-old child,
but recognized that the doctrine was difficult to apply to children. 00 In
Massachusetts, after the parents of a minor child diagnosed with leukemia
refused to continue the child's chemotherapy treatment, the child's
physician sought the child's commitment to the legal custody of the
Department of Public Welfare ("DPW") for the limited purpose of
providing necessary medical care."1' The superior court, finding that there
was a substantial chance for a cure and a normal life for the child if he
underwent treatment, ordered the child committed to the legal custody of
the DPW. 22 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed,2 '" recognizing that wxhile there exists a "'private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter,' Nse think that family autonomy is not
absolute, and may be limited where, as here, 'it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of (their) child.' - 4
The substituted judgment standard has been criticized when used in cases
where there is no reliable evidence concerning the patient's viewpoint about
the proposed treatment.") ' At least one court would not allow substituted
judgment when there was a lack of evidence regarding what the adult
patient would do. In January 1983, Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car as
she traveled down a road in Missouri."" The car overturned and a state

198. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
ONlass. 1977).
199. See Hart )_ Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
200. See In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
201. Custodi' ol a Minor, 379 N.E.2d (1053, 1055 (%lass. 1978).
202. Id. at 1056.
203.

Id.

204.

Id. (citations omitted).

205. See Chris R. Hogle, Woodland v. Angus: The Right to Refuse Antipschotic Drugs
and Safeguards Appropriate for Its Protection, 1994 UTAH L. RE%. 1169, 1197 (1994)

(discussing the pitfalls of the substituted judgment doctrine).
206. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Mo. 1988).
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trooper discovered her lying face down in a ditch, without detectable
respiratory or cardiac function. - 7 An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed
Ms. Cruzan as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded
by anoxia.20 8 She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and
then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally
ingest some nutrition.-0
Ms. Cruzan's parents, who had been appointed as her co-guardians,
asked employees of the state hospital to terminate the artificial nutrition and
hydration procedures.:2° The employees refused to honor the request
without court approval.-' The parents then filed a declaratory judgment in
a Missouri trial court seeking a judicial authorization for the termination of
care.: 2 The trial court entered an order directing that the parents' request
be carried out, partially because during a somewhat serious conversation
with her housemate, Ms. Cruzan said that if sick or injured, she would not
wish to continue her life unless she could live "at least halfway
normally."' 2 3 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, reasoning that the
woman's conversation with her housemate was unreliable for the purpose
of determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the parents' claim
to exercise substituted judgment on the woman's behalf.2 4 On certiorari,
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a state was not required to
repose a fight of substituted judgment as to such decision with close family
members of the patient and that it could choose to defer to only the patient's
wishes.24 5 The Court stated, "But we do not think the Due Process Clause
requires the State to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the
16
patient herself."'
Because there is no evidence that a child has ever been competent,
"substituted judgment" is probably not applicable when deciding the issue
of whether to administer medication over a child's objection. The best
interests doctrine is more appropriate to children's use of psychotropic
medication.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d at 410-11.
Id.
Id. at 426.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
Id. at286.
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C. Rights
In 1967, juveniles were given due process rights after Gerald Gault, a
fifteen-year-old, was committed as a juvenile delinquent for an unknown
2 17
Gault was
term potentially spanning the entire period of his minority.
call2.
telephone
obscene
an
making
for
sheriff
the
taken into custody by
was a
he
because
rights
Neither he nor his parents were given procedural
21 9
The Supreme Court held that the boy was denied due
delinquent minor.
process of law because juvenile delinquency proceedings, which may lead
to commitment in a state institution, must measure up to the constitutional
The Supreme Court
standards of due process and fair treatment. 220
indicated that children might need greater protection because of their
psychological immaturity22' and cited sociological studies for the
proposition that "the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness,
impartiality and orderliness - in short, the essentials of due process - may
and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is
be a more impressive
22
concerned."
In another federal case, JL. v. Parhamn, two adolescent boys, J. R. and J.
L.. brought suit to obtain their release from more than five years of

confinement in a Georgia mental hospital pursuant to Georgia's mental
health laws. -22 The lawrs provided for the voluntary admission of minor
children to mental hospitals by parents or guardians. 22' Even though one of
the boys died xhile appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided the
class action case.2 -5 Under the Georgia statute, the superintendent of a
mental hospital was authorized to admit any child upon application by a
parent or guardian.226 The court concluded that Georgia's medical factfinding processes were reasonable and consistent with constitutional

217.
2181
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See generaltv In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at4
Id. at 5.
Id. at 27-28, 30-31.
Id.
Id. at 26
J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 114 (D.C. Ga. 1976) (citing the Georgia law in

effect at the time of the case, GA. CODE. ANN. § 88-503.1(a), (b) (1933), "The
superintendent of any facility may receive for observation and diagnosis ... any individual
under 18 years of age for whom such application is made by his parent or guardian .... If
found to show evidence of mental illness and to be suitable for treatment, such person may
be given care and treatment at such facility and such person may be detained by such facility
for such period and under such conditions as may be authonzed by law.").
224 JL, 412 F. Supp. at 114.
225.

Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 588 (1979).

226.

Id. at 590-91.
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guarantees 227 after expressing concern about the risk of error intrinsic in a
parent's decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care. 2
However, the court did not require a judicial determination and was
satisfied that some kind of inquiry by a "neutral fact-finder" was
sufficient. 22 That inquiry had to carefully probe the child's background
using all available sources.230 Of course, the review had to also include an
interview with the child. It was necessary that the decision-maker have the
authority to refuse admission for any child who did not satisfy the medical
standards for admission and that the child's continuing need for
commitment be periodically reviewed by an independent process as a
necessary check against arbitrariness in the initial admission decision.23'
D. Treatment Decisions

Children are considered unable to make independent decisions regarding
medical treatment. 2 If children are not allowed to make the decision to
refuse psychotropic medications, someone must make that decision for
them. In Florida, the law requires children to have at least one adult
representative, usually a guardian ad litem, to protect them and represent
their interests in court. 23 3

In the past three decades, a noticeable trend toward greater recognition of
children's rights by federal and state courts has emerged. 2 4 The Supreme
Court stated, "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. ' , 235 Justice Marshall, dissenting, wrote:
[Ojur cases have exhibited particular sensitivity to minors' claims to

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 620.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 613-14.

Parham,442 U.S. at 615.
Maggie Brandow, .4 Spoonful of Sugar Won't Help This Medicine Go Down:
Psychotropic Drugs for Abused and Neglected Children, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1152
231.
232.

(1999).
233. See Bernard P. Perlmutter & Carolyn S. Salisbury, "PleaseLet Me Be Heard: " The
Right of a Florida Foster Child to Due ProcessPrior to Being Committed to a Long-Term,

Locked Psychiatric Institution, 25 NoVA L. REV. 725, 74041 (2001) (discussing the
guardian ad litem role in administering psychotropic medications to children committed by
the Florida Department of Children & Families).
234. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights
do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights."). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88-89 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
235. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
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constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty by the State.
Because loss of liberty is no less a deprivation for a child than for an
respect to many of these
adult ...we have held that a minor's right with
2 36
adult's.
an
with
coextensive
virtually
is
claims
The Court has extended to minors the fundamental rights of privacy and
23 7
and abortion.238 The
bodily integrity in the context of contraception
emotionally charged and time-sensitive nature of the abortion decision can
be compared to the decision about administration of psychotropic drugs.
Both implicate fundamental constitutional interests and also both affect
familial relations. The tension between the preservation of the right of
parents to raise their own children while simultaneously upholding
constitutional protections exists in both scenarios. If a minor has the right
to choose to undergo an invasive procedure like an abortion, then certainly
she should have the right to refuse or accept other forms of medical
treatment on her own behalf.2 39 As such, the Supreme Court has struck
down state statutes that require a mature pregnant minor to obtain parental
consent before having an abortion. -4t
In the example of Florida, the state legislature's intent is "[t~o provide for
the care, safety, and protection of children in an environment that fosters
healthy social, emotional, intellectual, and physical development; to ensure
secure and safe custody; and to promote the health and well-being of all
children under the state's care." 24 ' The Supreme Court of Florida stated,
"reasonable workloads are essential to the proper functioning of
dependency courts in performing multiple important reviews and hearings
required of them by law and necessary for the best interests of the
children. 242
But is the state really able to have the best interests of children in their
custody in mind? Not always. According to Mark Hollis reporting for the
Sun-Sentinel in Fort Lauderdale, Florida:

[m]ore than one of every 10 children, or 5,100 kids, in the state welfare
system are on medications meant to treat depression, schizophrenia and
other mental disorders. The drug use is highest, [DCF Secretary] Regier
236. David Levell W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043, 1047 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
237. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977).
238. See Bellottii, 443 U.S. at 651; Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 74.
239. See Hawkins, supra note 176, at 2092.
240. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48 (finding that a Massachusetts statute requiring a
mature, unemancipated minor to obtain parental consent or judicial approval after
notification of her parents unconstitutionally burdened the minor's right to seek an abortion).
241. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1 )(a) (2003).
242. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 (Fla. 2000).
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said, among those 13 and older. Of that age group, more than 2,700
children, or roughly one in every four, are on the drugs.24 3
The prevalence of foster program abuse has been well recognized, from
children who are moved through one foster home after another, to children
who receive substandard medical care, or no medical care at all. 244 Child
protection workers carry larger caseloads than recommended and perform
law enforcement tasks, making the prospect of superior performance
increasingly unreasonable. 4 Caseloads have grown beyond the workers'
ability to provide minimal care for their constituents.24 6 Although the
National Child Welfare League recommends only fifteen cases per foster
care worker:'47 many systems are so over-burdened that caseworkers are
required to handle caseloads four times more than what they should have.2 48
According to Professor Richard Wexler, "[mlost people assume that
removing children from their parents means removing them from danger
and placing them in safety. Often it is the other way around. - 249 Although
foster children suffer disproportionately from serious emotional, medical,
and psychological disabilities, they usually receive woefully insufficient
care and frequently no therapeutic intercession of any kind.250
Mental disorders afflict 7.5 million children in the U.S., with about half
of these children suffering from conditions causing serious disability. 1
Hollis, supra note 28

243.

244. Laura A. Harper, The State's Dun- to Children in Foster Care - Bearing the Burden
of Protecting Children, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 793, 797 (2003).
245. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twvain Shall Meet. The Best Interests of Children
and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMIL. REv. 79, 119-21 (1997).
246. Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the
Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 10 (1994-95).
247. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN NND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CHILD MALTREATMENT ANNUAL REPORTS:

REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEMS-

NATIONAL STATISTICS ON CHILD ABUSE AND

NEGLECT 7 (2000).
248. Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through BYzantium: The Promise and Failure of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 679 (1999) ("Social workers
and their supervisors regularly handle more cases than recommended by licensing

organizations.
249. S. REP. No. 104-117, at 3492 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490,
3492.
K. Edward Greene, Mental Health Care for Children: Before and During State
CAMPBELL L. RE. 1, 36 (1990) (citing Michael B. Mushlin, Unsa/e Havens:
The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children From Abuse & Neglect, 23
250.

Custody, 13

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 202, 204, 207, 209 (1988)).
251.

NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL. FAMILIFS ON THE BRINK: THE IMPACT OF

CHILDREN WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (July
1999), available at
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Child-and AdolescentActionCenter&templa
te=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=22196 (last visited Apr. 21,
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When combined with the fact that the natural bonds of affection are absent
when the state acts as parent, 252 these disabled children have an increased
253
Aptly put in
likelihood of experiencing deprivations of due process.
Parhain v. J. R., "[flor a child without natural parents, we must
acknowledge the risk of being 'lost in the shuffle. ' - 24
VIII. SUMMARY
There is little doubt that psychotropic drugs, particularly anti-psychotics,
have troublesome side effects. Adults have a constitutional right to prevent
involuntary administration of such drugs in several contexts, including
incompetence to stand trial,255 prison transfers,256 and civil commitment.257
It is not clear whether children can refuse psychotropic medication against
their biological parents' wishes because parents usually make decisions for
their minor children. However, this is not always the case. At least one of
the justices of the Supreme Court has indicated that children have
constitutional guarantees similar to adults. 25"
Even if it is the case that biological parents may have their minor
children's best interests in mind, the assumption that state case workers,
acting as parents for children in custody, also have their best interests in
mind is probably inaccurate.259 If knowing a child's best interests involves
knowing the child, it would not be possible for a state case worker to know
each child.2"' There were 11,439 children in Florida's Children and
Permanency Program as of October 31, 2005. z l Since it is known that
2006).
252
Parham ) JR.. 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979).
253. See Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900-01 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding that claim that child suffered a deprivation of substantive due process in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not frivolous or malicious where the County officials placed him in
the foster home and negligently supervised that home).
254. Parham, 224 U.S. at 619.
255. Riggins v.Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 130 (1992) United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d
302, 304 (4th Cir. 1988).
256. Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1980).
257. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266. 269 (3d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1352 (D. Mass. 1979).
258. David Levell W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043, 1047-48 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
259. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 624 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("To
be sure, the presumption that a parent is acting in the best interests of his child must be a
rebuttable one, since certainly not all parents are actuated by the unselfish motive the law
presumes.").
260. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 28 ("[m]ore than one of every 10 children, or 5,100
kids, in the [Florida] state welfare system are on medications meant to treat depression,
schizophrenia and other mental disorders.").
261.
Health and Human Services: The Florida Department of Children & Families,
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children at age fifteen are just as capable to make decisions as adults,1 2 it
would be vise to allow those in state custody to make their own decisions
about the administration of psychotropic medication. This would not be the
first time that a decision made in the best interest of the child by a
biological parental may be different than a decision for the child made by a
state social worker, or that the child in state custody should be entitled to a
legal hearing before medical procedures are undertaken. In discussing the
rights of children whose best interests are determined by state guardians,
Justice Brennan implied that juveniles in state custody should be entitled to
a judicial hearing before their psychiatric treatment begins.2 63 He also
stated, "[t]he social worker-child relationship is not deserving of the special
and state
protection and deference accorded to the parent-child relationship
264
officials acting in loco parentis cannot be equated with parents.,

Child Protection and Permanency - Number of Children Under Protective Supervision (point
in time), http://dcfdashboard.dcf.state.fl.us/index.cfm?lastyear-0&purpose-id=WL%20 /
20%20&mcode=M0296&page-preview (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
262.

Grisso & Vierling, supra note 74, at 417-18.

263. Parham, 442 U.S. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The prospect of preadmission hearings is not likely to deter state social workers from
discharging their duties and ... juveniles committed upon the recommendation of their
social workers are entitled to ... hearings").
264. Id.
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